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ESSAY 
 
WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable 
Development: 
Legitimacy Through Holistic Treaty 
Interpretation 
 
JEFFREY LAGOMARSINO*
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization, technological development, and the growing 
awareness of issue linkages pose dynamic challenges to the 
relationships of international law’s distinct rule-systems.  Within 
the increasingly fragmented realm of international law, the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) holds a contentious position 
because of the relative extent to which it has been successful in 
advancing its mission of multilateral trade liberalization.  Much 
of this success is a result of the institution’s effective and binding 
dispute settlement system.  However, the WTO’s ability to 
reconcile multilateral trade liberalization with other, sometimes 
conflicting, public values, is a central concern to the institution’s 
legitimacy and is, therefore, vital to further advancing free trade 
and to realizing its many benefits.  By those who feel the WTO 
has an obligation or self-interest to address such issues as trade 
and labor or trade and environment (hereafter ‘trade and’ issues), 
generally one of two governance models is advocated — 
constitutionalization or global subsidiarity.1
 
* The author can be reached by e-mail at JL2647@columbia.edu. 
  As the European 
 1. See generally Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO 
Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16 GOVERNANCE 73 
(2003), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-
0491.00205 (arguing forcefully for a global subsidiarity approach). But cf. Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19, 19-25 (2000) (arguing for 
constitutionalization). 
1
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Union has demonstrated, these models are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.  Regardless of the merits or flaws of the 
constitutionalization of ‘trade and’ norms within the WTO treaty 
system, this approach has proven elusive and its realization 
remains unlikely in the short term.  Thus, WTO adjudicators 
have been left the ambiguous task of reviewing the extent to 
which the policy-balancing of diverse values done at the domestic 
level is consistent with the superior legal norms of the WTO 
Agreement.2
While there are several phenomena permitting WTO 
adjudicators to incorporate public international law,
  Public international law at times plays a role in this 
adjudication, given that it may fill normative gaps in the WTO 
treaty and provide a context for treaty interpretation. 
3 the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4 are of 
particular importance.  These rules not only guide adjudicators in 
treaty interpretation, but they permit adjudicators considerable 
access to general principles and substantive norms beyond the 
WTO treaty.  The extent and nature of the incorporation of public 
international law into WTO dispute settlement is highly 
contentious.  Some fear that the trend of considering non-WTO 
rules of international law will lead to ‘mission creep’ and judicial 
overreaching, thus constituting a threat to the multilateral trade 
regime’s legitimacy.5
 
 2. Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 1, at 81; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The 
Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 757-60 (1999), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=803745. 
  Others argue that the use of such rules is 
 3. See Jose Alvarez, The Factors Driving and Constraining the Incorporation 
of International Law in WTO Adjudication, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 611, 612-22 (Merit E. Janow et al. eds., 
2008) (describing the following four factors that both “drive and constrain” the 
incorporation of general international law: (1) the principles of competence de la 
competence and of effectiveness; (2) fears of non-liquet; (3) the self-perceived role 
of international judges and the “common law” of international tribunals; and (4) 
The Vienna rules of treaty interpretation). 
 4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 5. See José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 
146-58 (2002); see also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, 
DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 38-45 (Am. Enter. 
Inst. Press 2001); see also John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of 
Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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necessary for the WTO’s legitimacy in terms of ‘trade and’ 
issues.6
2. CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY AND REASONS 
FOR HOLISTIC TREATY INTERPRETATION 
  This analysis proposes how a full embrace of the general 
rule of treaty interpretation found in Article 31 may mitigate 
certain threats to legitimacy by incorporating international law in 
a manner that permits deference, rather than leading to ‘mission 
creep.’ 
Following the failed creation of the International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”), the resulting General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariff (“GATT”) treaty came to exist in great isolation from 
the greater corpus of international law that was developing 
simultaneously.7  The transformation of the GATT regime into 
the much more legalistic WTO regime in 1994, with the signing of 
the Marrakesh Agreement, occurred within the framework of 
international law.  Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (“DSU”) makes the critical recognition that the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law 
apply to the provisions of the WTO Agreement.8  The Appellate 
Body has since recognized that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are customary rules of 
interpretation.9
 
WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 262-66 (2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=421661. 
  Article 31(3)(c), which permits the contextual 
use of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between parties,” has potentially great implications as it 
allows WTO adjudicators to reach well beyond WTO law to apply 
 6. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: 
How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 577-78 (2001); see also Martti 
Koskenniemi, Address in Frankfurt, Germany: Global Governance and Public 
International Law 23 (Feb. 9, 2004), in 37 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 241, 263 (2004), 
available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MFrankfurt.pdf. 
 7. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s 
Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970). 
 8. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 9. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 26, 1996). 
3
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substantive international norms.  Thus, the question facing the 
WTO adjudicators is not whether international law is applicable 
in WTO cases, but rather what the nature of the complex 
relationship between WTO lex specialis and public international 
law is. 
The seemingly benign acknowledgement that WTO law is a 
part of public international law has unavoidably profound 
implications on the mandate of trade liberalization—implications 
that negotiators of the Uruguay Round could not have fully 
considered as they painstakingly bargained a momentous 
mandate for specific trade reforms.  The minds of the negotiators 
were understandably shaped by the relatively discreet and self-
contained world of the GATT regime.  Likewise, the future 
developments of public international law itself were less clear at 
the time.  It is therefore with similar naivety that the founders 
also included in the WTO preamble the bold yet vague language 
promoting “general welfare,” “sustainable development,” and 
“optimal use of the world’s resources.”  Multilateral trade 
liberalization is thus acknowledged as a means to higher societal 
aims, rather than an end itself.  Accordingly, the WTO preamble 
is often embraced by environmental and human rights advocates 
as a grand opportunity for the incorporation of substantive norms 
of other branches of international law. 
In response, ardent free trade advocates often pose three 
arguments against the application of environmental and human 
rights norms within the WTO dispute settlement system: (i) the 
relatively weak scope and enforcement mechanisms of other 
international legal regimes—mainly environmental and human 
rights—reflect a deliberate state desire for such, and the WTO 
has no authority or institutional interest to change this; (ii) the 
greater incorporation of international law threatens the regime’s 
effectiveness on trade promotion; and (iii) it opens adjudicators to 
charges of overreach, and creates a systemic risk of mission creep 
contrary to the intentions of founders. 
The first argument, essentially a realist interpretation, fails 
to account for the perspectives of the many civil society actors 
within states and transcending states, which represent different 
interests and values than the leaders of member states and many 
of the most powerful lobbying groups that heavily influence those 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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leaders.  Although still lacking the domestic agenda-setting 
power of lobbying giants, national and transnational civil society 
groups have proven themselves capable of creating a legitimacy 
crisis for the WTO regime, as made evident at the 1999 Seattle 
ministerial meeting.  Civil society groups promoting ‘trade and’ 
issues, such as environment and human rights, are here to stay, 
and in a digital age they will increasingly find new avenues to 
exert pressure on states and international organizations to live 
up to higher environmental and human rights norms—most of 
which states have already acknowledged and even committed 
themselves to through other treaties. 
While it is easy to focus on the more ridiculous and 
uninformed demands of these actors and dismiss them all 
accordingly, this ignores the reality that there are significant 
negative environmental and human rights externalities to trade 
liberalization, and the calls to account for them will only increase.  
It is equally important to note that the interests of NGOs of the 
Global North are often pursued in conflict with the interests and 
development needs of member states and NGOs of the Global 
South.10  While the northern NGOs are quite capable of having 
their voices heard, they represent only segments of global civil 
society.  On the whole, actors from organized civil society will 
play an increasingly vital role—if still not a democraticly 
accountable one—in the formation and empowerment of the 
public sphere as a deliberative medium between citizenry and 
international institutions such as the WTO.11
From a member state perspective, it is the inherently 
sensitive nature of environmental and human rights norms and 
the resulting divergent approaches to them that make strong 
  This phenomenon, 
in effect, flattens the traditional hierarchy on which international 
law was created, and thereby adds significant complexity to WTO 
legitimacy beyond ‘state intention.’ 
 
 10. This was the case in Shrimp-Turtle. See infra Part 3.1; see also Walden 
Bello, The “Shrimp-Turtle Controversy” and the Rise of Green Unilateralism, 
FOCUS ON TRADE (Bangkok), July 1997, 
http://focusweb.org/publications/1997/The%20Shrimp-Turtle%20 
Controversy%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20Green%20Unilateralism.htm. 
 11. See Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Global Governance, Participation and 
the Public Sphere, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 314, 320-24, 647-50 (2004).  This role 
is becoming increasingly institutionalized at the international level itself. 
5
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multilateral regimes on these matters so difficult to achieve.  This 
deficiency of enforced international agreements means that 
members are naturally more likely to rely on domestic policy to 
pursue such goals; and this domestic policy is likely to be highly 
variable in strength and scope, based on social values and 
economic interests.  WTO adjudication that ignores these realities 
is likely to be viewed by members as illegitimate infringement on 
state sovereignty. 
The second argument flows from the idea that liberalizing 
trade is always more economically beneficial than not 
liberalizing, and therefore to forego any progress in trade 
liberalization is to hinder the net benefits to society from trade.  
This view is well articulated by Jagdish Bhagwati, who states 
that: 
For instance, they [critics] argue that free trade is not sufficient 
for growth; we also need other supportive policies.  By and large, 
yes; and every serious scholar of trade has understood this from 
as long ago as the 1960s when the trade policies of the developing 
countries were being studied.  But then again, it does not follow 
that freeing trade is no better than not freeing it.12
The policy implication of this argument is that the WTO 
mission should remain as trade-focused as possible, and 
interpretation of WTO law should be accordingly narrow.  In this 
sense, there cannot be too much of a good thing (i.e. an ever 
growing and powerful legal regime promoting multilateral trade 
liberalization).  This reasoning is lacking for the fact that the 
general welfare created by liberalizing trade through the WTO is, 
at some point, offset by the negative externalities of a powerful 
legal regime that has at times hindered the realization of 
environmental and human rights norms—both of which are also 
essential to the high societal aims noted in the WTO preamble. 
 
Therefore, contradictory to both challenges above, WTO law 
must evolve in a manner more cognizant of its own advanced 
development relative to environmental and human rights law.  It 
is not difficult to understand how sustainable development and 
 
 12. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Reshaping the WTO, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan./Feb. 
2005, available at http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/bhagwati/ FEERFinal.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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general welfare could suffer from negative externalities that 
would result from the lopsided and parochial growth of any of the 
different international legal regimes—one must only imagine a 
theoretical reversal in the development of international trade law 
and international environmental law.  In this case, the 
externalities of the environmental treaties and enforcement 
mechanisms would in some ways inhibit the agenda of trade 
liberalization.  Naturally, many environmental advocates would 
claim that environmental protection is unequivocally good, no 
matter the extent to which it out paces trade liberalization.  
Likewise, it would be expected that in such a circumstance free 
trade advocates would feel slighted by the lack of consideration 
afforded trade matters in the international environmental legal 
regime, be it via limitations to national sovereignty on trade 
matters or ignoring international trade norms.  Given that trade 
liberalization is a key means to achieving economic gains, general 
welfare would be hurt by the unwillingness of environmentalists 
to give ample consideration to important interests beyond their 
particular cause.  In this sense, there can be too much of a good 
thing if pursued in an ardently parochial manner.13
Third, ardent trade enthusiasts fear that giving meaning to 
the WTO preamble through the greater incorporation of 
international law will inevitably lead to mission creep, which is 
detrimental to the institution’s legitimacy on trade.  This alarm is 
exaggerated.  WTO adjudicators have proven themselves acutely 
aware of these fears, as well as the restricting language in DSU 
Article 3(2), which expressly states that the “recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.”
 
14  DSU Article 7 
again confirms that WTO tribunals “are not courts of potentially 
general jurisdiction.”15
 
 13. Human rights are the possible exception, but even policies advocating 
human rights are commonly pursued in a manner far too parochial. 
 
 14. DSU, supra note 8, art. 3.2. 
 15. Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law, 33 J. 
WORLD TRADE 87, 113 (1999); DSU, supra note 8, art. 7.  Pursuant to Article 7, 
the mandate of panels is to examine claims made under any of the “covered 
agreements.” Id.  This infers the mandate of adjudicators and does not include 
non-WTO agreements. 
7
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Concerns of judicial overreach were similarly voiced after the 
panel in Japan-Film established the principle of non-violation 
claims.16  Since then, panels and the Appellate Body have 
rejected most all non-violation claims.  Moreover, the WTO has 
already shown itself more prone to mission creep via the 
incorporation of non-trade issues in the negotiation rounds at the 
behest of powerful interest groups in developed countries.  The 
TRIPS Agreement is a prominent example, as the Uruguay 
Round would likely have failed without the support of the United 
States if it were not for this inclusion of intellectual property 
rights.17
Even accepting that over a decade after its conception the 
WTO’s institutional legitimacy requires that greater adjudicative 
consideration be given to preambular goals, the task remains to 
define a modernized interpretation of the relationship between 
the preamble and the rights and obligations of the WTO 
Agreement.  Guidance can be found in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, which confirms that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”  Article 31(2) explicitly states “the purpose of 
the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes. . .”  To the detriment of 
their own argument, many advocates of the higher goals outlined 
in the WTO preamble fail to appreciate that the raison d’etre of 
GATT, and subsequently the WTO, is trade and not sustainable 
development, general welfare, or any other aims.  Despite how 
advanced the WTO is relative to other international regimes, it 
has bureaucratic and legal limitations such that it can provide 
little public utility if its adjudicators are charged with becoming 
the guardians of environmental and human rights law.  Rather, 
the operational assumption of the WTO is that increasing the 
 
 
 16. See generally Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer 
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998). 
 17. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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benefits from trade is the single, yet valuable, contribution to 
sustainable development and general welfare that WTO offers. 
The subtle point here is that it is not inconsistent with this 
fact to say that WTO adjudication, which permits trade that is 
contrary to the goals in the preamble, is misguided according to 
Article 31.  In this sense, the preamble does much more than “add 
colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the 
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement” as the Appellate 
Body stated in Shrimp-Turtle.18  Specifically, with regard to the 
role of WTO adjudicators, the preamble does not demand the 
advancement of environmental and human rights norms; it only 
obstructs interpretation of WTO rights and obligations from 
impairing achievement of the highest goals that all major 
international regimes (environmental, human rights, and trade) 
claim to promote, namely sustainable development and general 
welfare.  This is more than a semantic distinction; it is one that 
significantly limits the judicial principles of competénce de la 
competénce and of “effectiveness” with respect to claimants 
evoking non-WTO law.  Pauwelyn argues that as this limitation 
on jurisdiction was upheld in EC-Poultry, adjudicators would 
presumably have greater latitude with respect to competénce de 
la competénce and of effectiveness in the event that non-WTO law 
was evoked by a member in defense.19
Moreover, the interpretive obstruction performed by the 
preamble holds true even where clear international norms are 
absent on ‘trade and’ matters, so long as there is significant 
intellectual consensus upon which states base their decisions, or 
  This nuanced 
understanding of the Appellate Body’s jurisdiction protects 
adjudicators from the perception of overreaching and mission 
creep. 
 
 18. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 153, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) [hereinafter 
Shrimp-Turtle]. 
 19. Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, ¶ 156, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 13, 1998) 
(adopted July 23, 1998).  For analysis, see Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 568 
(discussing how the Appellate Body rejected the claimants request to consider 
the Oilseeds Agreement; stating that the Appellate Body is not a court of 
general jurisdiction, but a dispute resolution body of limited jurisdiction). 
9
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“common intentions”20
Alvarez advises the “self proclaimed ‘progressives’” that 
“customary international law developments are not limited to the 
possible rise of the precautionary principle or the elucidation of 
economic and social rights.”
 amongst WTO members.  Nowhere does 
the WTO Agreement state that preambular goals are legitimate 
only to the minimum extent provided by public international law. 
21  He further warns that the 
International Court of Justice’s judgment in Oil Platforms should 
give progressives concern that similar use of the principle of 
effectiveness by WTO adjudicators could mean applications of 
customary rights to own property and new definitions of “fair and 
equitable” and “non-discriminatory” with regard to foreign 
investors and traders.22
Given that all norms have some degree of negative 
externalities, there is no avoiding that these externalities must be 
weighed in the adjudication processes to determine what 
application of the law is most consistent with the preamble.
  However, there seems no valid reasoning 
by which self-proclaimed progressives who advocate multilateral 
trade liberalization should not generally support these 
applications of Article 31(3)(c) as long as they do not cannibalize 
Article 31(2). 
23  It 
is for this precise reason that allowing amicus curia briefs was, 
although risky, a necessary step for the WTO dispute settlement 
system.  Far greater steps must be taken to institutionalize 
scientific and other intellectual expertise in the WTO 
adjudication process in order to help determine whether domestic 
policies are justifiable protections or disguised trade restraints.24
 
 20. See Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 575-76. 
 
 21. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 629. 
 22. Id. 
 23. In Shrimp-Turtle, both critics and proponents of the AB ruling could 
claim their interpretation is more consistent with sustainable development.  In 
this author’s opinion, careful analysis shows that the Appellate Body’s ruling 
was correct in this regard.  The Appellate Body would do its public image well to 
give more detailed explanation of its rulings in light of the preamble. 
 24. For such recommendations, see Siobán D. Harlow, Science-Based Trade 
Disputes: A New Challenge in Harmonizing the Evidentiary Systems of Law and 
Science, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 443, 446-47 (2004). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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3. METHODOLOGY FOR A “GLOBAL 
SUBSIDIARITY”25
Merely justifying the incorporation of international law in 
the adjudication of WTO disputes does not adequately describe 
how it may address legitimacy critiques, nor does it give guidance 
to adjudicators who bear the heavy responsibility of 
jurisprudence.  The preceding discussion identified the 
complexities that an increasingly powerful public sphere poses to 
the WTO dispute settlement system, but does not imply that 
adjudicators ought to tailor their rulings to please civil society.  
Not only would this be impossible to achieve, but it would cause 
irreparable damage to the institutional legitimacy as perceived by 
member states.  Rather, adjudicators, in recognition of their own 
tenuous legitimacy, should provide greater deference to 
democratically accountable national authorities, which may then 
serve as a buffer for many of civil society’s demands.  Article 31 is 
then a critical judicial tool for WTO adjudicators as it permits 
“horizontal subsidiarity”
 APPROACH TO TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 
26 by which they may defer to other 
international norms beyond WTO law in the many instances 
where the WTO treaty is ambiguous.  This holistic approach to 
treaty interpretation also permits vertical subsidiarity, as it 
allows national authorities greater deference on many ‘trade and’ 
issues, particularly environment, health, and human rights.  
Deference to the policy balancing of democratic member states 
does not deny WTO adjudicators their superior competence on 
substantive norms like nondiscrimination or procedural norms 
such as transparency and due process.27  This methodology of 
jurisprudence not only fosters legitimacy in the short term, it also 
helps to mitigate normative conflicts inherent in a fragmented 
international legal system, which is critical to the long-term 
success of the international trade regime.28
 
 25. See generally Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 1. 
  A look at the history 
 26. Id. at 75. 
 27. Id. at 87. 
 28. See generally Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration 
and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279 (2005)  
(giving a detailed discussion of systemic integration as implied in Article 
31(1)(c)). 
11
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of WTO case law shows that the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence 
has evolved towards this less mechanical and more holistic 
approach to treaty interpretation.29
There are several judicial principles pertinent to the holistic 
approach to treaty interpretation found in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention.  WTO case law reveals that adjudicators 
have regularly resorted to the principle of judicial restraint—the 
so-called ‘passive virtues’—based on the practice of U.S. judges.  
Alvarez aptly describes the traditional understanding of judicial 
restraint within the context of international law: 
 
International adjudicators share other characteristics that are 
likely to pull them away from the mainstream and back to 
demarcated rulings of lex specialis. . . . Common canons of 
construction to promote judicial restraint include the principle of 
judicial economy that dictates issuing an opinion on the 
narrowest possible ground or the principle of non ultra petita 
that requires judges not to decide matters except those raised by 
the parties.30
In the context of the WTO dispute settlement system, this 
notion of judicial restraint has led to interpretations of lex 
specialis that have been at times so narrow and textual as to 
infringe on state sovereignty beyond what members intended, 
particularly in cases of ‘trade and’ issues.
 
31
 
 29. Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body 
Report in US – Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 120 (2006) 
(claiming that the Appellate Body diverged from its holistic trend in their ruling 
on US-Gambling). 
  Such parochial legal 
reasoning may inhibit states from the legitimate pursuit of 
policies that promote non-trade agendas, as well as their legal 
responsibilities under other facets of international law.  It is with 
great risk to their legitimacy that democratically unaccountable 
WTO adjudicators assume the task of restraining domestic policy 
based on contentiously narrow interpretations of WTO law.  
Nevertheless, in the tradition of domestic judges, WTO 
 30. Alvarez, supra note 3, at 619. 
 31. Several important WTO Panel rulings have committed such fault, 
including Shrimp-Turtle, EC-Asbestos, EC-Hormones, and EC-Biotech.  
Fortunately, the Appellate Body reversed or modified several panel findings in 
the first three of these cases. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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adjudicators have often chosen to err towards ‘dictionary 
jurisprudence,’ albeit to a much lesser extent than GATT panels.  
Vast differences between mature, coherent domestic legal 
systems and the fragmented international legal system, coupled 
with an increasing understanding of issue linkages, make the 
application of traditionally passive virtues yield different and, at 
times, dubious results at the level of international adjudication.  
The residual effect of such narrow legal reasoning is to further 
aggravate the fragmented international legal system, particularly 
when it is done by the WTO, which has the most powerful 
adjudicative body of any international legal regime. 
All international adjudicators are to some extent norm 
entrepreneurs far beyond their domestic counterparts.  Treaties 
are less complete and their political contexts are often much more 
complex.  The methodology herein suggests redefining judicial 
restraint and the so-called ‘passive virtues’ at the international 
level in a manner that is more appropriate given the 
fragmentation of international law and the democratic deficit of 
adjudicators.  WTO adjudicators ought to show a judicial 
restraint that is more akin to the deference described above.  This 
recognizes that in the case of international law, ‘overreaching’ 
does not just occur to the extent that adjudicators go beyond their 
mandate, but also to the extent that they mechanically interpret 
treaty text in a parochial manner.  By taking the recommended 
approach, WTO adjudicators would be more ‘passive’ and less 
likely to be viewed by civil society and member states as 
overreaching. 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation, most notably used in 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), is useful for the 
above methodology.  Margin of appreciation is the principle by 
which an international tribunal may evaluate the application of 
international norms by national governments.32
 
 32. See generally Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2006) (giving a detailed 
discussion of the doctrine). 
  The two basic, 
yet intertwined, principles of the doctrine are judicial deference 
and normative flexibility, which together allow for a degree of 
discretion to be granted to national authorities as the primary 
appliers and interpreters of norms.  Normative flexibility 
13
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specifically applies to international norms that lack universal 
interpretation.  These principles are implicitly recognized in WTO 
Agreements, as well as numerous instances of WTO case law.  
Consistent with margin of appreciation, Article 17.6 of the Anti-
dumping Agreement states: 
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5: 
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall 
determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts 
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was 
unbiased and objective.  If the establishment of the facts was 
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even 
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the 
evaluation shall not be overturned; 
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law.  Where the panel finds that a 
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one 
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ 
measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon 
one of those permissible interpretations.33
This notion of standard of review applies only to 
antidumping, and its inclusion came after great negotiation.
 
34  
Ministers at the Marrakesh Conference decided that in three 
years this notion of deference would be reassessed to determine if 
it should be made more generally applicable.35
 
 33. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods: Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement]. 
  Both the growing 
fragmentation of international law and the need for WTO law to 
balance diverse values require that Article 17.6 not only be made 
 34. See generally Steven Crowley & John Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, 
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 231 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl 
eds., 2003) (giving a detailed analysis of the standard of review). 
 35. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Review of Article 17.6 
of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/40-
dadp2_e.htm [hereinafter Decision on Art. 17.6]. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss2/3
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generally applicable, but that it have a practical effect.  While 
Article 17.6 may currently be interpreted as an instance of WTO 
law contracting out of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, which repeatedly imply that treaty interpretation 
must be based on a single meaning of the text, this semantic 
conflict should be clarified via the Doha negotiations.  Specific 
guidance should be incorporated in Article 17.6 that permits 
multiple interpretations in circumstances where there is a 
conflict of trade and non-trade norms, as well as when the issue 
relates to preambular goals. 
A look at WTO case law shows that member states are 
permitted leeway given their relative preferences on certain 
matters.  By way of one example, in EC-Asbestos, the Appellate 
Body held that “it is undisputed that WTO members have the 
rights to determine the level of protection of health that they 
consider appropriate in a given situation.”36  Similar declarations 
were made in US-Tuna,37 Shrimp-Turtle, and EC-Hormones.38  
In addition to permitting a greater margin of appreciation, the 
methodology for legal reasoning proposed above specifically 
requires “operationalizing.”39
 
 36. Appellate Body Report. European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 
2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). 
 Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, states that, “[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context . . . (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”  
Campbell McLachlan has suggested that Article 31(3)(c) implies a 
principle of “systemic integration within the international legal 
system” and that it serves as the international adjudicator’s 
 37. Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 3.73, 
DS21/R - 39S/155 (not adopted, circulated on Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter US-
Tuna]. 
 38. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), ¶ 253(g), WT/DS26/AB, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).  
Here the Appellate Body rejected the panel’s interpretation of Articles 3.1, 3.2, 
and 3.3, and thereby essentially allowed a margin of appreciation with regard to 
Member States’ harmonization of international sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. See generally Jenny Martinez, Towards an International Judicial 
System, 56 STAN. LAW REV. 429 (2003). 
 39. Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of 
International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 102 (1998). 
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“master-key which permits access to all of the rooms” of 
international law.40
3.1 Shrimp-Turtle 
  For WTO adjudicators, operationalizing 
Article 31(3)(c) entails applying international law as needed to 
permit states the margin of appreciation necessary on ‘trade and’ 
matters, particularly in order to give meaning to the broad 
preambular goals. 
The landmark Shrimp-Turtle case brought the Appellate 
Body’s ability to resolve trade externalities to center stage as it 
dealt with the competing values of environmental protection and 
trade liberalization.  Specifically, the Appellate Body defined its 
task as “the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between the right of a member to invoke an exception 
under Article XX and the rights of the other members under 
varying substantive provisions . . . of the GATT 1994.”41  The 
“line of equilibrium,” according to the Appellate Body, must 
safeguard that “neither of the competing rights will cancel out the 
other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of 
rights and obligations constructed by the members themselves in 
that Agreement.”42
In evaluating the United States’ ban on the importation of 
shrimp caught without turtle excluder devices under Section 609 
of the Endangered Species Act, the Appellate Body referred 
extensively to international environmental law in order to 
interpret the vague terms of Article XX, which offers an 
exemption to GATT obligations.
 
43
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
  Article XX states: 
 
 40. See McLachlan, supra note 28, at 280-81. 
 41. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 159. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. ¶ 125-45. 
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. . . 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
. . . 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption. . .44
The Appellate Body specifically sought clarification from 
Article 56 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”),
 
45 Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development,46 and the Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals47 to determine that natural 
resources constitute both living and non-living resources.  
Further, the Appellate Body referred to Appendix 1 of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”)48 to conclude that, because they 
are listed as endangered, sea turtles are in fact “exhaustible.”49  
Thus, the Appellate Body first found Section 609 to be qualified 
under Article XX(g), and subsequently turned to determine if it 
also met the standards of the chapeau.50  The Appellate Body 
stated that the chapeau of Article XX was “but one expression of . 
. . good faith,” which it recognized as a general principle of 
international law.51  Article 31(1)(c) was then explicitly evoked to 
“interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking interpretive 
guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of 
international law.”52
 
 44. Id. ¶ 113. 
  The Appellate Body found, accordingly, that 
 45. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 46. See generally Report of the U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., June 3-14, 
1992, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151/26 (1992). 
 47. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 
June 23, 1979, UNEP/CMS (entered into force Nov. 1, 1983), available at 
http://www.cms.int/documents/convtxt/cms_convtxt.htm. 
 48. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), App. 1, opened for signature Dec. 31, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1087 
(entered into force July 1, 1975). 
 49. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 25. 
 50. See id. ¶¶ 123, 134. 
 51. Id. ¶ 158. 
 52. Id. 
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Section 609 violated the chapeau by failing to allow for 
multilateral negotiations regarding the ban and instead was 
unilateral in nature, amounting to unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination.53
First, by recognizing that Section 609 qualified under the 
language of Article XX(g) as a general principle of international 
law, the Appellate Body rejected the complainant’s argument that 
the “exhaustible natural resources” only included mineral and 
other such non-living resources, a decision contrary to what was 
agreed upon at the time of GATT negotiations.
 
54
 The Appellate Body’s interpretation of the chapeau of 
Article XX also exemplified the janus-faced nature of Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention, which affirms that the primary means of 
treaty interpretation is based on the “ordinary meaning” of the 
terms in the treaty.
  This 
demonstrated precisely the manner in which references to 
international law can permit adjudicators to modernize the 
meaning of WTO language in accordance with the preamble.  This 
aspect of the Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report was a critical 
step toward a more sustainable international trade regime and 
equally important for the legitimacy of the WTO in 
environmental matters. 
55  The Appellate Body determined that the 
ordinary meaning of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” 
was that members must attempt serious multilateral negotiations 
prior to taking unilateral actions.56
 
 53. Id. 
  In this manner, the policy-
balancing goal of the United States was assessed via the 
incorporation of international law, but its implementation was 
still subject to the higher norms of WTO lex specialis.  One would 
be remiss to underestimate the substantial impact of this opinion 
on the field of public international law.  The finding that the 
United States was at fault because of its failure to negotiate 
multilaterally before taking unilateral action boldly asserts a 
notion of state responsibility to cooperate, which has implications 
 54. The Appellate Body pointed out that this 1947 definition of “exhaustible 
natural resources” is debatable itself, as the migratory fish species had already 
been considered such under two adopted GATT rulings. Id. ¶¶ 127-31. 
 55. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 620-21. 
 56. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶¶ 171-72. 
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far beyond WTO law.57  Despite striking down Section 609, the 
Appellate Body’s ruling was consistent with sustainable 
development, which requires coordinated and mutually 
supportive environmental and trade polices amongst states.58  
This concerted multilateral effort is particularly necessary to 
prevent the harm that “green protectionism” could likely have on 
developing countries.  While developing countries often support 
environmental aims of developed countries, they need assistance 
in meeting these higher standards that unilateral protectionist 
policies do not unusually contain.59
 The international trade of biofuels represents a foreseeable 
environmental concern that will require unilateral trade 
measures as a “stop gap” until a multilateral agreement is 
achieved.
  Moreover, the Appellate 
Body recognized that should multilateral negotiations fail—as 
they undoubtedly will at times—member states have every right 
to take unilateral action under Article XX. 
60  Howse argues that according to the Appellate Body’s 
second ruling in Shrimp-Turtle, not even multilateral 
negotiations are required before unilateral action, so long as the 
member taking the action adequately accounts for the different 
conditions in the different countries that will be affected by the 
policy.61
 
 57. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 632-33. 
 
 58. As the Appellate Body noted, this approach is explicitly supported in 
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See 
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 18, ¶ 41 
 59. BELLO, supra note 10, at 174-75. 
 60. See generally Stephanie Switzer, International Trade Law and the 
Environment: Designing a Legal Framework to Curtail the Import of 
Unsustainably Produced Biofuel, 6 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 30 (2007). 
 61. According to Howse: 
The importance of negotiation to the operation of environmental trade measures 
is not discussed or even referred to in the AB's second ruling. This is apparently 
because the AB found, in its second ruling, that the U.S. was able to build into 
unilateral operation of its scheme sufficient flexibility, by certifying countries 
that had a program comparable in environmental effectiveness, even if it 
worked differently than the domestic U.S. regulation. 
Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New 
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
491, 509 (2002). 
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3.2 EC-Biotech 
 The legal reasoning of the panel in the EC-Biotech dispute 
is an example of an unnecessarily parochial approach taken by 
WTO panels and has raised questions as to the legitimacy of the 
dispute settlements system.  The panel dealt specifically with 
whether the EC’s regulatory approach to genetically modified 
organisms (“GMOs”) based on the precautionary principle is 
permitted under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”).62  While Article 
31(1)(c) permits access to all sources of international law 
“applicable in the relations between the parties,” the panel in EC-
Biotech unfortunately reiterated the reasoning of the GATT panel 
in US-Tuna, which declined to consider treaty law, except that 
which was binding on all 149 members of the WTO, thereby 
subsequently disallowing the vast majority of treaty law and 
limiting the adjudicators to customary international law.63  
Conversely, Pauwelyn correctly suggests that in the context of 
applying non-WTO law via Article 31(1)(c), the non-WTO law 
must reflect the “common intentions” of all WTO members.  This 
does not infer that all WTO members must be bound by the non-
WTO law, but rather that they are at least implicitly tolerant of 
it.64  The dynamic nature of international norms makes this 
distinction of particular concern as it is critical that WTO 
adjudicators remain, to some extent, open to normative 
developments in other branches of international law.65  According 
to the suggestion of Pauwelyn, the panel for EC-Biotech should 
have considered the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, on which 
the EC based its precautionary stance to GMOs.66
 
 62. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, 1, WT/DS291,292,293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) 
(adopted Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotech]. 
  Currently, 
sixty eight WTO members have ratified the Cartagena Protocol 
 63. See id. at 10-11; cf. US-Tuna, supra note 37, ¶ 4.27. 
 64. For further discussion, see Pauwelyn, supra note 6, at 575–76. 
 65. Caroline Henckels, GMOS in the WTO: A Critique of the Panel’s Legal 
Reasoning in EC — Biotech, 7 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 278, 286-88 (2006). 
 66. Id. at 301. 
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and another thirty three have signed it.67  This protocol deals 
specifically with the international trade of GMOs and the risks 
therein associated with biological diversity.  The Cartagena 
Protocol, which was created with the explicit intention to be 
compatible with members’ obligations to other international 
agreements,68 certainly could have aided the panel in their 
interpretation of the terms of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement to 
determine the members’ rights and obligations.69
3.3 Conclusion 
  Moreover, the 
precautionary principle, while not explicitly stated in the SPS 
Agreement, is entirely relevant and sure to resurface in WTO 
disputes as opinio juris on the matter becomes increasingly clear.  
The panel therefore missed an important opportunity, regardless 
of the degree of its normative flexibility, to embrace the principle 
in a manner that would give clarity to Article 5.7. 
The WTO finds itself in an uneasy position where much is 
expected of it as the dominant legal regime in a fragmented 
international legal system that lacks a hierarchy of norms.  It has 
become a lightning rod for globalization’s critics; it is upheld as 
having the potential to be a progressive transnational economic 
constitution; and ardent free traders wish to protect and advance 
trade in the narrowest manner.  The first step to fostering greater 
WTO legitimacy is to diminish the drama and the expectations 
 
 67. See Convention on Biological Diversity, Parties to the Protocol: Status of 
Ratification and Entry into Force (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties; see also Marc Busch & Robert Howse, A 
(Genetically Modified) Food Fight: Canada’s WTO Challenge to Europe’s Ban on 
GMProducts, C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENTARY Sept. 2003, at 186 n.12, available at 
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_186.pdf.  Howse and Busch note that 
the United States is the sole disputant not to have signed or ratified the 
Cartagena Protocol, although it has signed the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, to which the Protocol is a supplementary agreement.  The United 
States did actively participate in the drafting of the Cartagena Protocol and 
conveyed that the precautionary principle was valid international law. 
 68. The Cartagena Protocol preamble reads: “Emphasizing that this Protocol 
shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a 
Party under any existing international agreements.” Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, opened for 
signature May 15, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entered into force Sept. 11, 2003). 
 69. Henckels, supra note 65, at 301. 
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that have over the years become associated with this one 
organization.  Permitting greater deference to the judgment of 
democratically elected national authorities is an important start 
in this regard.  A methodology has been shown whereby this can 
be remedied via greater incorporation of international law into 
WTO jurisprudence. 
While this paper has dealt primarily with the application of 
Article 31 in ‘trade and’ disputes relevant to the preamble, the 
interaction of WTO lex specialis and international law is even 
more complex, as it encompasses a wide range of procedural and 
substantive norms.  Additionally, this interaction affects a variety 
of cases, from the landmark rulings involving ‘trade and’ matters 
like Shrimp-Turtle to the most mundane cases such as EC-
Chicken classification.70  Regardless of the law that members will 
negotiate into the WTO Agreement, it is clear that there are 
various factors both encouraging and restricting the proliferation 
of international norms considered in WTO dispute settlement.71
Broad, yet common, goals such as sustainable development 
and general welfare, which all branches of international law 
purport to promote, require mutually supportive legal regimes.  It 
can even be argued that the very long-term realization of the 
specific norms of each regime requires this same mutual support.  
To the contrary, however, legal parochialism remains a 
significant impediment.  While there are many reasons for this 
reality, international adjudicators have the ability and, 
increasingly, the desire to abate some of this contention.  Alvarez 
refers to this as “the self-perceived role of international judges 
and the developing ‘common law’ of international tribunals.”
  
Such organic growth is certainly not constrained to the WTO and 
proves that the international legal system has taken on a life of 
its own. Figuratively speaking, the normative ship that is 
international law has set sail and it has inevitably gone beyond 
what the member states originally intended. 
72
 
 70. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, 
WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005). 
  In 
a rapidly globalizing world, in which issues are increasingly 
 71. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 612-22. 
 72. Id. at 618-20. 
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transnational and transsubstantive, most international 
adjudicators appreciate, at least implicitly, the desirability of 
systemic integration and the emergence of a functioning 
international judicial system based on common procedural rules 
and interpretation of norms.  In the words of Jenny Martinez, 
this would serve “many values, among them, predictability, 
fairness, ease of commercial interactions, and stability through 
satisfaction of mutual expectations.”73
If this grand vision can be said to exist among international 
adjudicators, even vaguely, then at least the normative ship has 
direction.  The impediments to the development of a coherent 
international judicial system are immense and approaching this 
end with zeal could likely do far greater harm than good.  At a 
minimum, adjudicators should adopt a policy of “do no harm” in 
this regard.  Martinez refers to this as “system-protective 
reasoning,”
 
74 whereby adjudicators “consider if there is a course 
that furthers, rather than impedes, the development of an 
ordered international system.”75
From the once self-contained era of GATT, the WTO 
Appellate Body has joined in a constructivist trend towards 
holistic treaty interpretation within the realm of public 
international law.  Given the exceedingly difficult task of 
adjudicating international trade matters in accordance with 
terms as extraordinarily dynamic as “sustainable development,” 
the Appellate Body should be praised for the cautious steps it has 
taken to evolve the WTO treaty via case-law.  Nevertheless, WTO 
jurisprudence remains unacceptably far adrift from its preamble.  
WTO adjudicators must remain increasingly open to interpret 
trade law relevant to the ever-changing backdrop of public 
international law.  In this sense, the ambiguities of the WTO 
treaty are perhaps a virtue, allowing adjudicators the creative 
license necessary in the context of their work. 
 
 
 
 
 73. For detailed analysis of the emerging international judicial system, see 
Martinez, supra note 38, at 429. 
 74. Id. at 528. 
 75. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 567 (1987). 
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